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Supervisory Governance?  
 
Abstract 
 
 
The European Securities and Markets Authority (‘ESMA’) was established six years ago. It, 
and its sibling bodies for banking, and the insurance and occupational pensions sector, 
emerged from the ashes of the crises, and the agencies have been the topic of much discussion 
in academic scholarship from a variety of perspectives. This article provides a new situating 
of ESMA within the broader policy context. Employing empirical observations, and rooting it 
within the related literature on supervisory governance (defined, broadly, as the supervisory 
practices and enforcement measures that contribute to governing the EU’s financial set-up), it 
explores ESMA’s pro-active use of its direct supervisory and enforcement powers, and uses 
this as a launching pad for reflecting on how EU supervisory governance is evolving.  
 
Specifically, the article speculates that although ESMA is still at a relatively youthful stage 
with respect to its direct role, it is strengthening its reputation as a credible and pro-active 
supervisor, and is becoming an important driver with respect to the evolution of EU 
supervisory governance. This article suggests that, over time, ESMA’s influence and 
approach could gradually result in the greater centralisation of supervisory governance at the 
EU level. Linked to this, the article also speculates that any such shifts in this regard will 
continue to develop slowly, and over time, rather than via any seismic shift. Further, although 
there are a number of barriers and constraints to ESMA’s operation, the article suggests that 
none of these are intractable. 
 
Keywords: European financial regulation; European Securities and Markets Authority; 
Supervisory governance.  
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1 Introduction 
 
The European Securities and Markets Authority (‘ESMA’) was established over six years 
ago. It, and its sibling bodies for banking, and the insurance and occupational pensions sector, 
emerged from the ashes of the financial crisis, and the agencies have been the topic of much 
discussion in academic scholarship from a variety of perspectives.1 This article provides a 
new situating of ESMA within this broader policy context. Employing empirical 
observations, and rooting the analysis within the related literature on supervisory governance 
(defined, in general terms, as the supervisory practices and enforcement measures that 
contribute towards the overseeing of the EU’s financial system), it examines the conferral on, 
and ESMA’s use of, its direct supervisory and enforcement powers, and uses this as a 
launching pad for reflecting on how EU supervisory governance is evolving.  
 
Specifically, the article speculates that although ESMA is still at a relatively youthful stage 
with respect to its direct operational responsibilities, it is strengthening its reputation as a 
credible and pro-active supervisor, and is becoming an important driver with respect to the 
evolution of EU supervisory governance. This article suggests that, over time, and in line with 
arguments observable in the related scholarship on institutional governance, 2  ESMA’s 
                                                     
* Slaughter and May Lecturer in Corporate Law, Faculty of Law, Cambridge. I am grateful to an 
anonymous referee and Marc Moore for helpful comments and suggestions on earlier versions. I am 
also grateful for comments received following presentations to the SLS’ Banking and Financial 
Services Section at the annual conference in Oxford, September 2016, and to a University of 
Cambridge Centre for Commercial and Corporate Law seminar in October 2016. The usual disclaimers 
apply. 
1 There is an emerging, burgeoning literature with respect to all three agencies. In particular both legal 
scholarship, and the related political economy literature examine key questions with respect to the 
development of the EU agencies; the constraints placed on them; and how they operate with respect to 
the tools they have been granted. The scholarship stemming from a political economy standpoint also 
particularly examines and speculates as to which particular influences assist in shaping the EU’s 
institutional architecture. See in particular, Niamh Moloney, ‘Institutional Governance and Capital 
Markets Union: Incrementalism or a "Big Bang"?’ (2016) 13 ECFR 376; Madalina Busuioc, ‘Rule-
Making by the European Financial Supervisory Authorities: Walking a Tight Rope’ 19 European Law 
Journal 111; Pierre Schammo, ‘The European Securities and Markets Authority: Lifting the Veil on the 
Allocation of Powers’ (2011) 48 CML Rev 1879. From a banking sector perspective, see Eilís Ferran, 
‘The Existential Search of the European Banking Authority’ (2016) 17 European Business 
Organization Law Review 285. From a political economy angle, see e.g. Daniel Mügge, ‘The Political 
Economy of Europeanized Financial Regulation’ (2013) 20 Journal of European Public Policy 458. For 
related analysis, especially with respect to EU regulatory governance, the current Capital Markets 
Union project, and the possible deployment of a more ‘experimentalist approach’, see Niamh Moloney, 
‘Capital Markets Union: "Ever Closer Union" for the EU Financial System?’ (2016) 41 European Law 
Review 307; Jonathan Zeitlin (ed) Extending Experimentalist Governance?: The European Union and 
Transnational Regulation (OUP 2015). 
2 Specifically, for a discussion of such overlapping incremental developments that are observable with 
respect to the shape of the overall institutional design of the EU, see in particular Moloney, 
‘Institutional Governance and Capital Markets Union: Incrementalism or a "Big Bang"?’ (n 1); 
Moloney, ‘Capital Markets Union: "Ever Closer Union" for the EU Financial System?’ (n 1). 
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influence and approach could gradually result in the greater centralisation of supervisory 
governance at the EU level. Indeed, such incremental developments can be evidenced, for 
instance, via the EU’s current Capital Markets Union (‘CMU’) project. This flagship initiative 
aims to strengthen the EU’s capital markets,3 and has led to proposals focused on further 
strengthening the EU’s supervisory framework (although notably this has also led to more 
emotive suggestions concerning the establishment of a single European capital markets 
supervisor). 4   Linked to this, the article speculates that any such supervisory shifts will 
continue to develop slowly, over time ‘the way it has always happened’, rather than via any 
seismic shift.5  There is one caveat to this analysis, however; as the current EU set-up adjusts 
following the ‘Brexit’ decision, this could lead to a more interventionist agenda materialising 
from some quarters.6   
 
The article is structured as follows. After this introduction, section 2 contextualises the 
analysis. Section 3 then uses empirical observations with respect to three case studies: credit 
rating agencies; trade repositories; and short selling. For clarity, the first two topics concern 
the conferral of direct day-to-day supervisory responsibilities on ESMA. The third relates to 
the distinct, but related, grant of direct emergency powers of intervention on ESMA. Section 
4 considers the implications for EU financial law and supervisory governance. Section 5 
concludes. 
2 The Context  
 
All three European Supervisory Authorities (‘ESAs’) were created in January 2011, along 
with the European Systemic Risk Board (‘ESRB’) that was mandated to oversee risk in the 
financial system as a whole. In conjunction with the Member State national supervisors, the 
ESAs, and the ESRB form the European System of Financial Supervision (‘ESFS’). 7 
Respecting the Treaty principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, the ESFS is conceived 
largely as a decentralised structure and day-to-day supervision is intended, in the main, to be 
carried out at the Member State level by the national competent authorities (‘NCAs’) closest 
to the markets and institutions that they supervise.8 One exception however, concerns the 
                                                     
3 This project, amongst other aims, seeks to ensure more diversified sources of finance to enable all 
types of company can tap the capital markets, see e.g. European Commission, ‘Action Plan on Building 
a Capital Markets Union’ (COM(2015) 468 final). 
4 Jean-Claude Juncker and others, Completing Europe's Economic and Monetary Union: The 'Five 
Presidents Report' (June 2015) 12; European Commission, Capital Markets Union - Accelerating 
Reform COM(2016) 601 Final (2016) 7. Note that the UK in particular voiced concerns about such 
controversial suggestions, see e.g. House of Lords European Union Select Committee, ‘Whatever It 
Takes’: The Five Presidents’ Report on Completing Economic and Monetary Union (13th Report of 
Session 2015–16, 12 May 2016) 42-43. 
5 Former French President Sarkozy, as quoted by Lord Pearson, UK Parliamentary Debate (Hansard, 
HL, 2 July 2009, col 328); Moloney, ‘Institutional Governance and Capital Markets Union: 
Incrementalism or a "Big Bang"?’ (n 1). See also European Commission, ‘Public Consultation on the 
Operations of the European Supervisory Authorities’ (March 2017). 
6 Niamh Moloney, ‘Financial Services, the EU, and Brexit: An Uncertain Future for the City?’ (2016) 
17 German LJ 75, 80. 
7  The ESAs replaced the former ‘Level 3’ committees that included the Committee of European 
Securities Regulators (‘CESR’), ESMA’s predecessor, Jacques de Larosière, The High-Level Group on 
Financial Supervision in the EU: Report (2009).  
8 Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 Establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Securities 
and Markets Authority) [2010] OJ L331/84, recital 9; Jacques de Larosière (n 7) 47. The ESFS’s 
architecture is commonly referred to as the ‘hub and spoke’ model; rulemaking is centralised but the 
focus of supervision largely remains at the national level, European Commission, Commission 
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oversight of credit rating agencies (‘CRAs’).9   Here, responsibility for direct day-to-day 
supervision has been transferred to ESMA.10 ESMA has a wide range of supervisory powers 
over CRAs, and can also take enforcement action, including the imposition of financial 
penalties.11  
 
The transfer of supervisory competence over CRAs has not been the sole exception to the 
rule, and the development of ESMA’s role as a ‘credible direct supervisor’, 12  and as a 
fundamental component of the ESFS, is now evident in other areas of financial market 
activity. In particular, in 2012, ESMA was granted direct responsibility for the registration 
and supervision of trade repositories within the EU (broadly, bodies who collect and maintain 
records of derivatives trades), again with such functions extending to include enforcement 
powers.13 The gradual expansion in ESMA’s competence can also be observed in relation to 
short selling regulation. ESMA is granted direct powers of intervention in exceptional 
circumstances; it can, subject to a detailed set of procedural conditions and constraints, 
prohibit or impose conditions on the entry into a short sale and such measures will prevail 
over prior actions taken by NCAs.14 Each of these three case studies evidence the gradual 
extension to ESMA’s operational role over time, and each will be further elucidated upon 
through reflecting on the empirical facts on the ground. 
3 Three Case Studies 
 
3.1 Credit Rating Agencies  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
Communication: European Financial Supervision COM(2009) 252 Final (2009) 9; Eddy Wymeersch, 
‘The European Financial Supervisory Authorities or ESAs’ in Eddy Wymeersch, Klaus J. Hopt and 
Guido Ferrarini (eds), Financial Regulation and Supervision: A Post-Crisis Analysis (OUP 2012) 234; 
Carmine Di Noia and Matteo Gargantini, ‘Unleashing the European Securities and Markets Authority: 
Governance and Accountability after the ECJ Decision on the Short Selling Regulation (Case C-
270/12)’ (2014) 15 EBOR 1, 40. 
9 Jacques de Larosière (n 8) 19. CESR (ESMA’s predecessor) first highlighted this issue in 2004, 
CESR, Preliminary Progress Report: Which Supervisory Tools for the EU Securities Market (2004 Ref 
(04-333f)). 
10 Regulation (EU) No 513/2011 Amending Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 on Credit Rating Agencies 
L145/30. See e.g. ESMA, ‘ESMA's Role in European and International Regulatory Cooperation’ 
(Chief Executive Speech, 12 June 2012) who observes that bringing CRAs under the ‘umbrella of EU 
supervision is a milestone achievement’. 
11 CRA Regulation II recitals 14, 17-18. 
12 ESMA, Strategic Orientation 2016-2020 (ESMA/2015/935) 3; European Commission, Report on the 
Operation of the European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) and the European System of Financial 
Supervision (ESFS) (COM(2014) 509 final). See also European Court of Auditors, EU Supervision of 
Credit Rating Agencies –Well Established but Not yet Fully Effective (Special Report No 22, 2015). 
13 Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 on OTC Derivatives, Central Counterparties and Trade Repositories 
[2012] OJ L201/1, arts 55-81; Eilis Ferran, ‘Understanding the New Institutional Architecture of EU 
Financial Market Supervision’ in Eddy Wymeersch, Klaus J. Hopt and Guido Ferrarini (eds), Financial 
Regulation and Supervision: A Post-Crisis Analysis (OUP 2012) 152. 
14 Council Regulation (EU) No 236/2012 on Short Selling and Certain Aspects of Credit Default Swaps 
[2012] OJ L86/1, art 28. Although beyond the scope of this paper, ESMA will also be granted further 
direct powers with respect to the sale of particular financial instruments under the MiFID II/MiFIR 
reforms (although implementation of these rules has been postponed and is now currently anticipated 
for 2018). 
 5 
First, what are CRAs? Put simply, they are companies that assess the credit-worthiness of 
issuers and financial instruments. CRAs can have a major impact on the markets as ratings 
actions are carefully tracked by, amongst others, issuers, investors, borrowers, and 
governments.15 CRAs traditionally issued opinions on the probability of default or expected 
losses of companies and governments; however in the years leading up to the financial crisis, 
CRAs also provided ratings for more exotic financial instruments, and CRAs were close to 
the origin of the problems that arose with the sub-prime market in 2007. In particular, CRAs 
gave favourable opinions on instruments financially engineered to give high confidence to 
investors, who took insufficient interest in the instruments’ risk characteristics, preferring to 
rely on a CRA’s expertise. 16  As the financial crisis evolved, the CRAs were criticised, 
especially for failing to reflect the worsening market conditions in their ratings early enough, 
and then for not adjusting their credit ratings in time following the deepening crisis.17   
 
Some of these issues arose especially from conflicts of interest inherent in the ratings business 
due to what can be termed the ‘issuer-pays’ model. Specifically, as a CRA was, generally, 
paid by the same issuer whose creditworthiness it was rating, this model created potential 
conflicts of interest for the CRA.18 Although there is a counter-argument, in that CRAs must 
protect their reputation with investors, and balance any short-term gain from satisfying an 
issuer, with its long-term reputation in the market, it is questionable whether the risk of 
reputational loss can actually act as an effective sanction.19  Indeed, this is especially true with 
the ratings of complex financial instruments during the crisis, where the fees that CRAs could 
obtain strongly impacted their assessments.20 In particular, the major investment banks that 
brought in this work acquired much power over the agencies: if they were dissatisfied with a 
rating, business could be moved elsewhere. 21 Consequently, to retain a client, the rating had 
to ‘satisfy’ them, creating the possibility of influencing the overall process.22  
 
In the light of this, an early round of EU reforms on CRAs was adopted in 2009: one of the 
first key EU regulatory responses to the financial crisis. These reforms attempted to tackle the 
main issues that had become apparent during the crisis,23 and CRAs established in the EU 
became subject to a range of rules including a registration requirement, and provisions aimed 
at avoiding conflicts of interest.24  During the eurozone sovereign debt crisis, however, CRAs 
                                                     
15  European Commission, Impact Assessment for a Regulation Amending Regulation (EC) No 
1060/2009 on Credit Rating Agencies SEC(2011) 1354, 6. 
16 European Commission, Impact Assessment Accompanying the Proposal for a Regulation on Credit 
Rating Agencies SEC(2008) 2746 7. 
17 Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 on Credit Rating Agencies L302/1, recital 10. 
18 Impact Assessment CRA I (n 16) 14-20; John Coffee, ‘What Went Wrong? An Initial Inquiry into 
the Causes of the 2008 Financial Crisis’ (2009) 9 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 1, 8. 
19 Jakob de Haan and Fabian Amtenbrink, ‘Credit Rating Agencies’ DNB Working Paper No 278/ 
January 2011 accessed 13 May 2016, 8. 
20 Ibid 8. 
21 John Coffee (n 18) 9. 
22  Chris Brummer and Rachel Loko, ‘The New Politics of Transatlantic Credit Rating Agency 
Regulation’ in Tony Porter (ed), Transnational Financial Regulation after the Crisis (Routledge 2014) 
162. 
23 It also illustrated the EU’s desire to respond to, and frame the post-crisis international G-20 led 
agenda, see Niamh Moloney, EU Securities and Financial Markets Regulation (3rd edn, Oxford 
University Press, 2014) 648; Brummer and Loko (n 22).  
24 Impact Assessment CRA I (n 16). CRAs also became subject to rules on rating methodology; and 
rules seeking to increase transparency. The International Organisation of Securities Commissions’ 
(‘IOSCO’) Code of Conduct for CRAs formed a basis for this first round of CRA reforms, although the 
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were again the subject of criticism, especially politically, with respect to the transparency and 
quality of sovereign debt ratings (in essence, a CRA’s assessment as to the risk level 
associated with respect to investing in a particular country). In a similar vein to the political 
allegations levied at short sellers at the time, CRAs were accused of exacerbating the crisis, 
both through the decisions to downgrade various eurozone economies, and due to the more 
subjective nature of sovereign debt ratings that led to allegations of political bias.25 Other 
weaknesses were also re-emphasised, including the risk of an over-reliance on ratings by 
market participants; and the domination of the three main US agencies operating globally: 
Standard & Poor’s; Fitch; and Moody’s.26 
 
The result of this was further reforms to the rules, and CRAs are now subject to a set of three 
EU regulations (collectively the ‘CRA Regulation’).27 In brief, the provisions require CRAs 
to comply with rigorous rules of conduct to mitigate possible conflicts of interest, and to 
ensure sufficient transparency of credit ratings and the ratings process. 28  There are also 
specific requirements in relation to rating methodologies. Further, reflecting the impact of 
politicisation on the regulatory process, there are detailed provisions on the approach to be 
taken to sovereign debt ratings.29 The reforms also introduce measures to reduce an over-
reliance on credit ratings,30 as well as a new civil liability regime.31. From the supervisory 
perspective, oversight of CRAs is also the first exception to the rule that, by in large, day-to-
day supervision should be carried out at the national level.  
 
Before ESMA took over the supervisory reins in July 2011, the rules provided for a type of 
‘college-type’ supervision over CRAs that enabled all relevant national supervisors to 
participate in registering and supervising a CRA, in conjunction with a coordinating function 
via the Committee of European Securities Regulators (‘CESR’), ESMA’s predecessor.32 This 
rather complex supervisory framework was never considered to be a long-term solution for 
CRA oversight, however,33 and it was recognised there would be considerable advantages 
(especially factoring in the specificities and global nature of the ratings industry) in having 
                                                                                                                                                        
EU rules were stricter and more specific than the international code, see further IOSCO, Code of 
Conduct Fundamentals for Credit Rating Agencies (note that the IOSCO Code was also the subject of 
substantial revisions in 2008 in the light of the crisis, and most recently revised in 2015), IOSCO, Code 
of Conduct Fundamentals for Credit Rating Agencies (Final Report) (2015). 
25 Brummer and Loko (n 22) 168. Specifically, CRAs form their opinion on sovereign States based on 
a combination of both qualitative and quantitative considerations, including economic and fiscal 
history; default history; assessment of the political situation; and policy developments in a particular 
country. Such ratings are important from a credit market perspective as well as for financial stability: if 
a sovereign rating is changed, it can have a ‘cascade’ effect on other rated entities (such as banks) as 
sovereign ratings are usually a factor in the determination of other ratings. Further, during the recent 
crises, sovereign ratings also experienced high levels of volatility (both in relation to the number of 
downgrades and upgrades, as well as the frequency of ratings). 
26 Impact Assessment CRA III (n 15) 4-5; 7. 
27 CRA Regulation; CRA Regulation II; Regulation (EU) No 462/2013 Amending Regulation (EC) No 
1060/2009 on Credit Rating Agencies L146/1. The set of CRA reforms will be referred to as the ‘CRA 
Regulation’, although reference to an individual regulation will be made where relevant. 
28 CRA Regulation III, recital 1. 
29 CRA Regulation, art 8; art 8a. 
30 Ibid arts 5a-5c. 
31 Ibid art 35a. 
32  Ibid, recital 46, art 29; European Commission, Impact Assessment for a Regulation Amending 
Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 on Credit Rating Agencies SEC(2010) 678, 14. 
33 CRA Regulation, recital 51; CRA Regulation II, recital 8. 
 7 
centralised EU oversight of CRAs.34  It is also pertinent to observe that this transfer of 
supervisory competence from the national authorities to ESMA occurred relatively smoothly. 
Two main factors made this a less risky prospect for Member States: first, there were no 
major national interests at risk given the domination of the three key US agencies in the 
ratings business; and second, CRAs were a small (albeit influential) part of the financial 
markets, meaning the agencies were unlikely to require a Member State bailout that could risk 
implicating national taxpayers.35  
 
Finally, why is ESMA’s approach to supervising CRAs worthy of discussion? First, 
regardless of who supervises them, their regulation and oversight is an important and 
evolving issue. In particular, despite the considerable post-crisis efforts to stimulate 
competition in the CRA industry, the market remains oligopolistic, meaning it is vital that 
CRAs are subject to a tough regulatory framework that is backed up by a robust supervisory 
and enforcement regime.36 Further, as CRAs based in one country can issue ratings that have 
a pan-EU reach, it is, in principle, logical to transfer the ‘watchdog’ role to ESMA: it should 
be more effective and efficient for an authority with EU-wide reach to exercise direct 
oversight.37   
 
3.1.1 ESMA and CRAs: Direct Supervision  
The thinking on supervision varies with the times. Specifically, stances are shaped and driven 
by the wider economic and political climate. For example, in the pre-crisis days, a more light-
touch, ‘principles based’ approach was especially in vogue in the UK; although, 
unsurprisingly, this fell out of favour with the crisis, and post-crisis thinking has heralded a 
wider, global shift towards a more ‘risk-based’ supervisory model. 38  What is a risk-based 
approach? It has been defined as the use of systematised frameworks of inspection or 
supervision to manage regulatory or institutional risk, the focus being not on the potential 
risks that individuals or the economy face by a firm, but the risks the regulator faces in failing 
to achieve its objectives.39   
 
In essence, this type of model requires supervisors to make choices, and to decide what types 
and levels of risk they are prepared to tolerate, and such decisions will be especially 
influenced and dictated by the broader political backdrop, and the related risk to the 
regulator’s reputation.40 Consequently, the higher the political salience of a risk, the less a 
                                                     
34 CRA Regulation, recital 51; Impact Assessment CRA II (n 32).  
35 Eilis Ferran, ‘Financial Supervision’ in Daniel Mügge (ed), Europe and the Governance of Global 
Finance (OUP 2014) 34; Niamh Moloney, ‘The European Securities and Markets Authority and 
Institutional Design for the EU Financial Market – a Tale of Two Competences: Part (2) Rules in 
Action’ (2011) 12 European Business Organization Law Review 177, 204. 
36 See e.g. European Commission, ‘Report on the Credit Rating Agency Market’ (COM(2016)664) 21. 
37 Impact Assessment CRA II (n 32), 4; European Commission, Impact Assessment for a Regulation 
Establishing a European Securities and Markets Authority SEC(2009) 1235, 26. 
38 See e.g. Financial Stability Board, Increasing the Intensity and Effectiveness of SIFI Supervision: 
Progress Report to the G20 (2012); Julia Black, ‘Regulatory Styles and Supervisory Strategies’ in 
Niamh Moloney, Eilis Ferran and Jennifer Payne (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Financial Regulation 
(OUP 2015) 13.  
39 Julia Black, ‘Risk-Based Regulation: Choices, Practices, and Lessons Being Learnt’ in Risk and 
Regulatory Policy: Improvign the Governance of Risk (OECD Publishing 2010) 187-8; Black, 
‘Regulatory Styles and Supervisory Strategies’ (n 38). 
40 Black, ‘Risk-Based Regulation: Choices, Practices, and Lessons Being Learnt’ (n 39) 193. Broadly, 
it involves the regulator developing decision-making procedures in order to prioritise regulatory 
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supervisor’s risk tolerance is likely to be in that area.41 Applying this to CRA oversight, 
ESMA’s risk model focuses particularly on financial stability and likely regulatory failure, a 
stance on a par with broader post-crisis political attitudes with their emphasis on the 
prevention of financial market instability and systemic risk.42  The endorsement of a risk-
based model by ESMA is also likely to help ensure the continued political confidence in its 
ability to perform its operational role, which may indirectly bolster its credibility as a direct 
supervisor.43  
 
3.1.2 An Illustration: Sovereign Ratings Investigation 
In terms of specifics, ESMA is granted a broad set of direct supervisory powers ranging from 
information requests to the ability to conduct on-site inspections and investigations.44  In 
practice, ESMA has concluded a number of examinations (individual and thematic) including 
with respect to the more politically delicate area of the issuance of sovereign ratings.45 
Although this investigation was carried out before the final set of CRA amendments were 
introduced, it is helpful to reflect on as it exhibits ESMA’s willingness to tackle the more 
sensitive areas on its watch,46 and illustrates that its risk tolerance will be lower in this 
politically salient sector. 
 
ESMA’s sovereign ratings report was highly critical, identifying a wide number of concerns 
and deficiencies that could compromise the independence of the process, and the quality of 
such ratings.47 Issues included senior management involvement in rating activities; disclosure 
of upcoming actions to unauthorised third parties; significant delays in publishing ratings; and 
allocation of lead responsibilities to junior staff. Individual remedial action plans were set, 
and ESMA continued to monitor and assess their implementation as part of its on-going 
supervisory work, which subsequently led to enforcement action being instigated against 
Fitch (further discussed in section 3.1.7 below). 48  Aside from the political aspects, the 
investigation demonstrates ESMA’s enthusiasm for setting itself challenging targets and for 
engaging in ambitious and sensitive work. Pragmatically, such operations also enable it to 
                                                                                                                                                        
activities and utilise resources (especially relating to inspection and enforcement) based on an 
assessment of the risks a firm poses to the regulator’s objectives. 
41 Note that aside from the influence of political considerations, risk-based frameworks face other risks 
including model risk (the risk the model fails to encapsulate all relevant risks) and implementation risk 
(the risk the model is implemented inadequately), see ibid 186. 
42 ESMA, 2013 Annual Report: Credit Rating Agencies (ESMA/2014/151) 27-8. 
43 Black, ‘Risk-Based Regulation: Choices, Practices, and Lessons Being Learnt’ (n 39) 193-4. 
44 CRA Regulation II, art 23b-art 23d. ESMA’s powers are articulated in detail in line with Meroni. 
45  Other thematic investigations focused on bank rating methodologies; and the monitoring of 
structured finance ratings, see e.g. ESMA, Investigation into Structured Finance Ratings 
(ESMA/2014/1524). 
46 Moloney, EU Securities and Financial Markets Regulation (n 23) 674. 
47 ESMA, Sovereign Ratings Investigation (ESMA/2013/1775). 
48 ESMA, 2014 Annual Report on the Supervision of Credit Rating Agencies and Trade Repositories 
(ESMA/2015/280) 20. ESMA also subsequently conducted supervisory work on the compliance of the 
CRAs with the sovereign ratings disclosure requirements introduced by the CRA III Regulation (such 
additional measures included requesting CRAs publish sovereign and related ratings outlooks on a 
Friday after the close of business; clearly stating whether ratings were solicited or unsolicited; and 
requesting that CRAs notify a rated entity at least 24 hours before any public disclosure).  
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learn quickly about the CRA industry, and its ‘hands on’ approach contributes to it 
strengthening its reputation as a supervisor who wishes to drive change in the industry.49  
 
3.1.3 ESMA and CRAs: Ex Post Enforcement  
Particularly given the oligopolistic nature of the CRA industry, ex ante monitoring and 
supervision needs to be accompanied by effective ex post enforcement mechanisms in the 
event there is non-compliance. Such a system needs to, first, provide a deterrent effect to keep 
at bay the risk that CRAs will breach the rules, and second, where an infringement is 
committed, be capable of imposing a sufficiently strong penalty to compel a CRA to restore 
the situation.50  
 
Constitutionally, conferring direct enforcement powers on ESMA was controversial. 51  In 
particular, this was due to the long established constitutional constraints on the delegation of 
powers to EU agencies under the seminal Meroni doctrine.52 Specifically, although clearly 
defined executive powers, which can be subject to strict review, can be delegated to EU 
agencies; discretionary powers that imply a wide measure of flexibility cannot. With the 
Meroni constraints in mind, the European Commission (the ‘Commission’) initially sought to 
retain the ability to apply penalties itself,53 and although ESMA was eventually allocated a set 
of direct enforcement tools, linked to Meroni, its discretion is especially restricted in this 
regard.54 In particular, there is a highly detailed procedural framework articulated in the CRA 
rules with which ESMA must comply.55 Although rather technical, the main ‘bones’ of this 
regime are set out briefly below in order to support the subsequent analysis. 
 
Procedurally, where ESMA concludes there are serious indications of the possible existence 
of facts liable to constitute an infringement of the rules, 56  a rigorous process must be 
followed. First, an independent investment officer (‘IIO’) will be appointed to investigate.57 
                                                     
49 ESMA, 2013 Annual Report: Credit Rating Agencies (n 42). 
50 See e.g. Impact Assessment CRA II (n 32) 27. 
51 Ibid 30-31; House of Lords European Union Select Committee, (7th Report of Session 2010-2011, 
10 November 2010), 70-72. 
52 Case 9/56 Meroni v High Authority [1957 and 1958] ECR 133. 
53  E.g. Impact Assessment CRA II (n 32) 30-32. As Moloney observes, the Commission Impact 
Assessment Board highlighted Meroni concerns in relation to the justification of ESMA’s supervisory 
and enforcement powers. It queried why Meroni concerns were only raised in the context of 
sanctioning powers, and not with respect to ESMA’s registration and supervision powers. The second 
report highlighted the same concerns (although it acknowledged that the justification was somewhat 
improved), European Commission, Opinion on Impact Assessment on CRA II Proposal (Ref. 
Ares(2010)108790, February 2010); European Commission, Resubmitted Opinion on Impact 
Assessment on CRA II Proposal (Ref. Ares(2010)205437, April 2010); Moloney, ‘The European 
Securities and Markets Authority and Institutional Design for the EU Financial Market – a Tale of Two 
Competences: Part (2) Rules in Action’ (n 35). 
54 Moloney, EU Securities and Financial Markets Regulation (n 23) 674. 
55 CRA Regulation II, art 23e. 
56 Annex III lists infringements and these include: conflicts of interest, organisational or operational 
requirements, as well as obstacles to the supervisory activities, and infringements to the disclosure 
provisions. 
57 CRA Regulation II, art 23e. 
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On the basis of an IIO’s findings, and having heard those subject to the investigation, 58 
ESMA’s Board of Supervisors will decide if an infringement has been committed. If so, it 
shall take a supervisory measure, and potentially (where an infringement is committed 
intentionally or negligently), impose a monetary penalty. Supervisory measures are non-
financial and can include, for instance, withdrawing a CRA’s registration; and issuing a 
public notice.59 ESMA must notify any such decision to the CRA (as well as the NCA, the 
Commission, and the other ESAs) and has to make public the decision on its website within 
10 working days from the date it was adopted.60 This includes making public that the decision 
can be appealed to the Board of Appeal of the ESAs.61  
 
Where an infringement has been committed intentionally or negligently, 62 ESMA can impose 
a fine.63 Bearing in mind the Meroni concerns, ESMA’s powers are especially restricted and 
are subject to a detailed and rather rigid framework.64 The rules lay down minimum and 
maximum basic amounts depending on the infringement: for instance, for the lowest category 
of infringement, sanctions range from 10,000 to 50,000 euro; and the highest category ranges 
from 500,000 to 750,000 euro (with 750,000 euro being the maximum basic amount that can 
be imposed for a first infringement).65 The basic amount can be adjusted, if need be, taking 
into account aggravating or mitigating factors.66 There is also a ceiling whereby a fine is not 
to exceed 20 per cent of the annual turnover of the CRA in the preceding business year.67  The 
fines must be publicly disclosed unless exceptional reasons exist.68 Enforcement is governed 
by the civil procedure rules in the Member State in the territory of which it is carried out,69 
enforcement can be suspended only by the Court of Justice of the European Union (‘CJEU’), 
which can also review ESMA’s decision, and annul, reduce, or increase a fine imposed.70 
 
ESMA’s Board of Supervisors also has the power to impose a periodic penalty, which is 
designed to compel action by a CRA to put an end to an infringement.71 Such payments are to 
be ‘effective and proportionate’ and are to be imposed on a daily basis until the CRA 
                                                     
58 Ibid art 36c. Note in this regard, the Commission has published additional rules of procedure to be 
followed by ESMA, Commission Delegated Regulation 946/2012 on Rules of Procedure on Fines 
Imposed to Credit Rating Agencies by ESMA L282/23. 
59 CRA Regulation II art 23e(5); art 24(1). 
60 Ibid art 24(5). 
61 Ibid art 24(5); Regulation 1095/2010, art 60. 
62  According to art 36a(1), an infringement is intentional if ESMA finds objective factors 
demonstrating the CRA or its senior management acted deliberately to commit the infringement.  
63 CRA Regulation II art 23e(5); art 36a. 
64 Moloney, EU Securities and Financial Markets Regulation (n 23) 675. 
65 CRA Regulation II, art 36a. To determine whether the basic amount of the fine should be in the 
lower, middle, or higher end of the limits, ESMA shall have regard to the CRA annual turnover in the 
previous business year. 
66 Annex IV provides that, based on mitigating or aggravating factors, adjustment coefficients will be 
applied.  
67 CRA Regulation II, art 36a(4). Further, where the CRA has benefitted from the infringement, the 
fine shall be at least equal to that financial benefit. 
68 Ibid, art 36d(1). Such exceptional reasons include where public disclosure would damage financial 
markets or cause ‘disproportionate damage’ to the parties involved. 
69 Ibid art 36d(3).  
70 Ibid art 36d(3); art 36e. 
71 Ibid art 36b. 
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complies.72 Notwithstanding this, the provisions specify that the amount of the payment shall 
be three per cent of the average daily turnover and that a payment may not be imposed for 
more than six months. 73  Again, before such a penalty is imposed, the same procedural 
framework applies as for fines.74  The rules do not provide for criminal sanctions but ESMA 
can refer matters for criminal prosecution to the relevant national authority.75   
 
Although the inflexible framework surrounding ESMA’s enforcement powers cannot be 
avoided due to the legal sensitivities, the current level of sanctions that ESMA can impose do 
not seem proportionate to the turnover of the major CRAs in the industry (which was 
estimated as being as high as $2.4 billion in 2015).76  This issue will be returned to when 
analysing the fines ESMA has imposed so far in practice, but it is pertinent here to touch on 
the approach of ESMA’s overseas counterpart, the US Securities and Exchange Commission 
(‘SEC’). In particular, the SEC has never been ‘backward at coming forward’ in imposing 
tough sanctions, including on offending CRAs. By way of illustration, in October 2015, the 
SEC charged the US arm of a CRA (DBRS) with misrepresenting that it would monitor the 
ratings of complex instruments on a monthly basis as detailed in its surveillance 
methodology. 77   To settle the charges, DBRS paid nearly 6 million dollars, received a 
censure, and agreed to retain the services of an independent consultant to improve its internal 
controls.78  
 
One needs to be cautious about cursory comparisons between ESMA and the SEC (that are by 
no means equivalent), yet the SEC action helps to illustrate that the possible fines that ESMA 
can impose are unlikely to have a dissuasive impact on a large CRA in practice. It is true that 
sanctions are only one instrument in ESMA’s enforcement toolkit, 79 and so in theory the 
requirement for ESMA to publicly disclose the outcome could assist in influencing CRA 
behaviour for the better. Nevertheless, given that the threat of reputational loss has failed to 
act as a deterrent on CRAs in the past, it is debateable whether this tool can provide any 
meaningful impact in this area.  
3.1.4  Enforcement Powers in Practice 
The table below sets out a brief summary of the three CRA enforcement actions concluded by 
ESMA at the time of writing. In general, the cases all relate to a number of CRA internal 
control failures, including with respect to the retention of adequate records; inadequate 
compliance functions; and infringements of the rules concerning non-disclosure of 
information to unauthorised third parties. 
 
                                                     
72 Delegated Regulation 946/2012, art 36b(2). 
73 Ibid arts 36b(3)-(4).  This is reduced to two per cent in the case of natural persons. 
74 CRA Regulation II arts 36c-e; Delegated Regulation 946/2012. 
75 CRA Regulation II art 23e(8). 
76 European Commission, ‘Report on the Credit Rating Agency Market’ (n 36) 18; IMF, EU Technical 
Note on ESMA (IMF Country Report No. 13/69, March 2013) 18; ESMA, ESMA Sanctioning Powers 
under EMIR and CRAR: Letter to European Commission (January 2017) 
77 SEC, DBRS Administrative Proceedings (Release No. 76261, October 26, 2015). 
78  Ibid 8-12; SEC, ‘SEC Charges Credit Rating Agency with Misrepresenting Surveillance 
Methodology’ (October 2015)  <https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-246.html> accessed 21 
July 2016. 
79 E.g. Baldwin and Black refer to there being a pyramid of sanctions ranging from ex ante supervision 
and monitoring to more intrusive enforcement mechanisms in the event of non-compliance, see e.g. 
Robert Baldwin and Julia Black, ‘Really Responsive Regulation’ (2008) 71 Modern Law Review 59. 
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  ESMA Enforcement Action 
 
Enforcement Measures Number  Parties 
Public Notices 3 S&P (June 2014) 
DBRS (June 2015) 
Fitch Ratings (July 2016) 
Other Non-Monetary measure - - 
Fines 2 DBRS: €30,000 (June 2015) 
Fitch: €1,380,000 (July 2016) 
Periodic Payments - - 
 
 
3.1.5 First Public Notice: S&P 
The first case to be concluded resulted in a public notice censuring Standard & Poor’s 
(‘S&P’) for failing to meet some of the organisational requirements set out in the CRA 
rules.80  In brief, the facts concerned S&P’s production of ‘Banking Industry Country Risk 
Assessments’ (‘BICRAs’), which, according to S&P, were not credit ratings but an 
assessment of the banking systems in particular countries. 81  Nevertheless BICRAs were 
maintained in the same internal database as credit ratings and were displayed on its web-
based Global Credit Portal (‘GCP’) (one of the methods S&P used to disseminate its credit 
ratings and other financial information products). The predictable result was that BICRAs 
were treated as credit ratings, and no effective action was taken by S&P to address the 
implications this could have.82  
 
This led to the incident in the midst of the sovereign debt crisis, when an attempt to change an 
incorrect display of the BICRA for France triggered an email alert to S&P subscribers, 
erroneously informing them that S&P had downgraded its ratings of France (specifically, the 
email stated in its header, ‘France (Republic of) (Unsolicited Ratings): DOWNGRADE’).83 
Understandably, such an error, coming in the midst of the crisis, led to uproar in France, amid 
considerable speculation that the worsening state of France’s public finances could result in it 
losing its prized triple A status.84 
 
ESMA concluded that the incident resulted from control failures within S&P’s organisation; 
there was a clear lack of responsibility for the project, the relevant staff appeared 
inadequately informed, and they did not demonstrate sufficient or necessary understanding as 
to what was taking place.85 There was also a lack of effective oversight and responsibility: in 
                                                     
80 ESMA, 2014 Annual Report on the Supervision of Credit Rating Agencies and Trade Repositories (n 
48) 23.  
81 ESMA, Decision of the Board of Supervisors: S&P Public Notice (ESMA/2014/544) 4. 
82 Ibid 4. 
83 Ibid 3-4. According to Reuters, S&P was also criticised at the time for taking nearly two hours to 
correct the mistake, by which point the market had closed, ‘EU Watchdog Censures S&P for French 
Rating Cut Error’ Reuters (3 June 2014) <http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-esma-s-p-
idUKKBN0EE0KJ20140603> accessed 18 July 2016. 
84 Sam Fleming and Hugh Carnegy, ‘S&P Censured for Erroneous France Downgrade Alert’ Financial 
Times (3 June 2014) <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/326b279c-eafb-11e3-bab6-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz4EluV9HBk> accessed 19 July 2016. S&P did in fact subsequently 
downgrade France a few weeks later although the move had little effect on France’s borrowing costs. 
85 ESMA, Decision of the Board of Supervisors: S&P Public Notice (n 81) 5. 
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particular the person who had approved the upload of BICRA for France had ‘completely 
forgotten’ the information had been uploaded and was not aware BICRA was shown together 
with France’s sovereign rating.86 
 
The imposition of a non-monetary measure amounted to a cautious start to ESMA’s 
enforcement work, and the media suggested it fell short of the tough action European 
politicians wished to see with respect to the credit rating industry.87 Nevertheless, from a legal 
perspective, as ESMA was not satisfied the violation had occurred intentionally or 
negligently; a financial penalty was never an option. On a pragmatic point, this first case also 
demonstrates that the business of enforcement action takes time. ESMA’s S&P investigation 
commenced in November 2011, and was only concluded over two years later. Indeed, when 
one reflects on ESMA’s direct enforcement role, not only do the rigid procedural conditions 
make swift action tricky, so does the fact ESMA has to operate with relatively limited 
resources. For instance: in 2013 while the S&P investigation was progressing, out of 32 
ESMA staff devoted to CRAs,88 only approximately 20 per cent of staff time was engaged in 
day-to-day supervision and enforcement activity.89 Likewise out of ESMA’s total budget of 
28.1 million euro in 2013, only 5.7 million euro (approximately 20 per cent) was allocated to 
CRAs.90 In contrast (and, again, bearing in mind its different range of activities) in the UK, 
the Financial Conduct Authority’s total budget for the same period was £432.1 million.91  
With this in mind (and this issue will be returned to in section 4 below) ESMA clearly 
requires a bigger ‘budget envelope’ to be able to function more effectively as an enforcer in 
practice.92  
 
3.1.6 Monetary Penalties: DBRS  
In June 2015, ESMA concluded its enforcement action against the European arm of the CRA, 
DBRS, which resulted in a public censure, plus a fine with respect to one infringement. There 
were three main issues: first, the CRA had a corporate governance structure in place whereby 
the board of directors, and an ‘Executive Group’ worked alongside each other without any 
delegation from the board, and without the two bodies having procedures in place to report to 
                                                     
86 Ibid 5, 7. It also observed that there was also no clear procedure for taking rapid and effective 
corrective action once the error was discovered. 
87 Sam Fleming and Hugh Carnegy, (n 84). 
88 This was from a headcount of 139 ESMA staff, see ESMA, Annual General Supervision Report 
(2013) 73. 
89 Aside from this, approximately 35 per cent of staff time was engaged in thematic and individual 
investigations; 25 per cent in single rulebook and international cooperation; and 10 per cent in 
registration/perimeter and risk-analysis related activities (totalling 90 per cent of staff time), ESMA, 
Report on Staffing and Resources (ESMA/2014/939) 14. 
90 ESMA, Annual General Supervision Report (n 88) 68.  Note however that ESMA did observe that 
other authorities with CRA regulatory responsibilities such as the SEC’s Office of Credit Ratings had 
similar sized teams to those at ESMA, ESMA, Report on Staffing and Resources (n 89) 14.   
91 FCA, Business Plan 2013/14 (2013) 55; Moloney, ‘The European Securities and Markets Authority 
and Institutional Design for the EU Financial Market – a Tale of Two Competences: Part (2) Rules in 
Action’ (n 35) 214. 
92 IMF (n 76) 14-15 that observed ESMA’s budget envelope for 2013 was insufficient. This is an issue 
that the Commission is now consulting on; see European Commission, ‘Public Consultation on the 
Operations of the European Supervisory Authorities’ (n 5). 
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one another.93  Next, there were control failings: DBRS’s compliance department had no 
formal work plan during the period under investigation, and no risk assessment activities had 
been carried out. 94  Finally, DBRS also failed to meet the requirements with respect to 
adequate records and audit trails. For example, in certain instances DBRS could not confirm 
whether, or to what extent, documents provided to ESMA constituted all the existing records 
of procedures implemented by DBRS in order to comply with the CRA rules.95  ESMA 
concluded that DBRS had committed this third infringement negligently, and imposed a fine 
of 30,000 euro.96 
 
DBRS received the ‘dubious honour’ of being the first CRA to be the subject of a monetary 
penalty,97 yet the fine was minute; at most, a cost of doing business.98 The small size of the 
sanction is all the more notable when one again contrasts it with the SEC’s enforcement 
action against DBRS’s US arm (discussed in section 3.1.3 above). Even bearing in mind that 
the US proceedings concerned more serious offences, the SEC’s fine of almost 6 million 
dollars dwarfs that of ESMA’s.99 
3.1.7 Fitch  
ESMA’s most recent action against Fitch Ratings (‘Fitch), related to a set of negligent 
infringements, and resulted in a 1.38 million euro fine, plus a public censure. This arose from 
ESMA’s sovereign ratings investigation and involved three key issues. First, from December 
2010 until June 2012, certain senior analysts at Fitch passed on information about 
forthcoming rating actions on sovereign ratings to senior persons in one of Fitch’s parent 
companies. In particular, there were nine separate sets of email exchanges concerning actual 
or potential rating actions in six countries100 that infringed the requirements not to share or 
disclose information on new ratings with those not involved in their production.101 Next, Fitch 
failed to allow Slovenia the minimum period of time (12 hours) to consider and respond 
before publishing a sovereign rating, and also failed to provide it with the principal grounds 
on which the rating was based.102 Finally, Fitch’s internal controls were again affected by 
substantial shortcomings.103  
                                                     
93 ESMA, 2015 Annual Report on the Supervision of Credit Rating Agencies and Trade Repositories 
(ESMA/2016/234) 17; ESMA, Decision of the Board of Supervisors: DBRS Public Notice and Fine 
(ESMA/2015/1048) 5. 
94 ESMA, Decision of the Board of Supervisors: DBRS Public Notice and Fine (n 93) 7. 
95 Ibid 8-9. 
96 Ibid 9-10. 
97  ‘EU Ratings Watchdog Imposes First Fine on DBRS’ Financial Times (29 June 2015) 
<http://www.ft.com/fastft/2015/06/29/eu-ratings-watchdog-imposes-first-fine-on-dbrs/> accessed 20 
July 2016. 
98  ‘EU Watchdog Imposes Its First Fine on Rating Agency DBRS’ Reuters (29 June 2015) 
<http://www.reuters.com/article/eu-dbrs-fine-idUSL5N0ZF2C320150629> accessed 20 July 2016 
99 SEC, DBRS Administrative Proceedings (n 77). 
100 Greece, France, Spain, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, see ESMA, ESMA Fines Fitch Ratings Limited €1.38 
Million: Press Release (ESMA/2016/1157). 
101 Note that although the infringements stemmed from December 2010, ESMA found breaches only 
between 1 June 2011 and June 2012 when the infringement provisions of the CRA rules entered into 
force. 
102 ESMA, ESMA Fines Fitch Ratings Limited €1.38 Million: Press Release (n 100).  
103 ESMA, Public Notice: Fitch (ESMA/2016/1159) 3-4. The overall penalty of 1.38 million was made 
up of 60,000 euro for breaching the 12 hour requirement; 825,000 euro for the internal control failings; 
and 495,000 euro for the unauthorised disclosures (aggravating factors applied to the internal control 
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A number of observations can be made about the Fitch case. First, it demonstrates that 
ESMA’s on-going supervisory work is useful not only to improve practices and behaviour 
within CRAs, but also serves as a vital aid to teams in evaluating whether a CRA may be 
breaching the rules. Next, the Fitch penalty is the largest fine ESMA has imposed so far. 
Further, the case reiterates that, despite the constitutional issues, ESMA is embracing its 
direct responsibilities, and gradually making ‘ESMA-shaped changes’ 104  within the 
parameters it is required to operate.  
 
Yet on the other hand, as already observed, when one juxtaposes ESMA’s penalties with 
those imposed by the SEC, the difference remains stark. For instance, the SEC announced 
charges against S&P in 2015 involving fraudulent misconduct with respect to S&P’s ratings 
of certain complex financial products.105 To settle the charges, S&P agreed to pay more than 
58 million dollars, plus a further 19 million to settle parallel cases,106 and it was also banned 
for a year from rating certain products.107 The SEC also brought related fraud charges against 
Barbara Duka, a former S&P manager, who oversaw these ratings, and at the time of writing 
this case is continuing, despite Duka’s attempts to halt the use of the SEC’s in-house 
administrative proceedings. 108  
 
Some commentators have seized on SEC’s enforcement work and the scale of penalties 
imposed to argue that ESMA has been ‘timid’ in comparison, and that this represents a lack 
of willingness by ESMA to punish the agencies.109 This argument should be further reflected 
on. At a basic level, there is a chasm separating the SEC’s enforcement work from that of 
ESMA’s. Further, it is clear that the imposition of severe monetary sanctions plus (where 
relevant) fraud charges against allegedly complicit individuals will more likely achieve the 
enforcement objectives of punishment and deterrence. Yet, one should remain mindful about 
straightforward comparisons: the US and the EU are two very different systems, and this 
section has identified that ESMA is required to engage in any enforcement activity within 
strict limits.  
                                                                                                                                                        
failings and the unauthorised disclosures). The overall penalty also reflected the fact that Fitch had 
voluntarily taken measures to ensure the infringements could not be committed again in the future. 
104 Moloney, ‘Institutional Governance and Capital Markets Union: Incrementalism or a "Big Bang"?’ 
(n 1) 389. 
105 ‘S&P in $77m Mortgage Securities Settlement with the SEC’ Financial Times (21 January 2015) 
<http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/2a5201cc-a188-11e4-bd03-00144feab7de.html#axzz4F86jBtIC> accessed 
22 July 2016; SEC, ‘SEC Announces Charges against Standard & Poor’s for Fraudulent Ratings 
Misconduct’ (January 2015)  <https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-10.html> accessed 22 July 
2016. In particular, S&P had misrepresented that it was using one approach for its ratings when in fact 
it was using a different methodology to make its ratings less conservative. Further, after being frozen 
out of the market for rating particular products, in a bid to re-enter it, S&P published a false and 
misleading study that omitted crucial data, and claimed that its ratings could withstand a ‘Great 
Depression-style economic collapse’.  
106 SEC, ‘SEC Announces Charges against Standard & Poor’s for Fraudulent Ratings Misconduct’ (n 
106). The parallel cases were brought by the New York and Massachusetts Attorney General’s offices. 
107 The resolution of this case also paved the way for the subsequent resolution of a settlement with the 
US Department of Justice, where S&P agreed to pay almost 1.4 billion dollars, Ed Beeson, ‘SEC's Stiff 
S&P Sanction Raises Curtain for DOJ Action’ (2015)  <http://www.law360.com/articles/613620/sec-s-
stiff-s-p-sanction-raises-curtain-for-doj-action> accessed 22 July 2016 
108 Note that the SEC has, ‘SEC Can Resume Case against Ex-S&P Executive -U.S. Appeals Court’ 
Reuters (13 June 2016) <http://www.reuters.com/article/sec-duka-idUSL1N1951ZT> accessed 22 July 
2016.   
109  See e.g. Daniel Cash, ‘Credit Rating Agency Regulation after the UK's European Union 
Membership Referendum’ (2016) 37 The Company Lawyer 195.  
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Next, no consensus has emerged in the literature as to the best way to measure enforcement’s 
intensity or effect; for instance looking at the size of a penalty imposed fails to account for the 
deterrent effect of reputational penalties.110 Nevertheless, in the context of CRAs, given that 
the risk of reputational loss failed to act as an effective deterrent in the past, it may be 
questioned whether reputational penalties can ever offer a meaningful impact here. Moreover, 
even if publishing sanctions could assist in influencing behaviour for the better, the three 
ESMA cases (especially the Fitch action) generated only relatively limited mainstream press 
coverage.111  
 
On the upside, this area is now a work in progress; in late 2016, the Commission proposed 
revisions to the CRA sanctioning system to ensure that it is credible and proportionate as a 
deterrent.112 Indeed, a useful comparator for the Commission in making revisions could be its 
related competition enforcement regime, both with respect to the scale of the fines that can be 
imposed, and in relation to its explicit framework for calculations that factors in (amongst 
other issues) an infringement’s gravity, duration, and effect.113  With this in mind, relatively 
simple refinements to the CRA sanctioning regime could involve ensuring that all breaches of 
the rules are capable of being enforced; basing fines on a CRA’s turnover (rather than 
turnover only being relevant as a cap); and significantly increasing the upper limit of the 
penalties that could be imposed.114 Such amendments could help ensure that fines can have a 
dissuasive effect in practice, and bolster ESMA’s credibility in its enforcement work.  
 
3.2 Case Study 2: Trade Repositories  
 
CRAs were not the sole exception to the rule that supervisory responsibilities should 
generally be orchestrated at the national level. Due especially to a lack of transparency 
surrounding derivatives trading (such as options and futures contracts) during the financial 
crisis, a post-crisis framework (the European Market Infrastructure Regulation (‘EMIR’)) was 
put in place that requires such trades to be reported to entities known as trade repositories.115 
Such entities act as a type of ‘middleman’ for ESMA; rather than individual firms submitting 
trade reports to ESMA, the information is submitted to the trade repository that maintains 
records that can then be made available to regulators.116  Consequently, these middlemen are 
                                                     
110 John Armour, Colin Mayer and Andrea Polo, ‘Regulatory Sanctions and Reputational Damage in 
Financial Markets’ Research Paper Number 62/2010, 1 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1678028> accessed 24 September 2015; John 
Coffee, ‘Law and the Market: The Impact of Enforcement’ (2007) 156 University of Pennsylvania Law 
Review 229. 
111 For instance, on a simple Internet news search, the S&P censure generated the most broadsheet 
coverage, including reports by the FT; the Telegraph; and the Financial News, as well as legal coverage 
from Pinsent Masons (via ‘Out-Law.com’). The DBRS fine was reported by Reuters, the FT, and again 
by Pinsent Masons. The recent Fitch case generated no major coverage aside from via Reuters, and the 
‘West Australian’ (a devoted FT search produced no results).  All three cases also received some 
industry specific reports (e.g. via ‘the Investment Executive’; and ‘Waters Technology’). 
112 European Commission, ‘Report on the Credit Rating Agency Market’ (n 36) 20. 
113 See e.g. European Commission, Commission Re-Adopts Decision and Fines Air Cargo Carriers 
€776 Million for Price-Fixing Cartel (March 2017); European Commission, Fines for Breaking EU 
Competition Law (November 2011). 
114 ESMA, ESMA Sanctioning Powers under EMIR and CRAR: Letter to European Commission (n 76). 
115 Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 on OTC Derivatives, Central Counterparties and Trade Repositories 
[2012] OJ L201/1 (comonly referred to as ‘EMIR’).  
116 Finance Magnates, ‘Is ESMA’s €64,000 Fine of the DTCC the First of More to Come?’ (2016)  
<http://www.financemagnates.com/institutional-forex/bloggers/esmas-e64000-fining-dtcc-first-come-
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intended to play an important role in in ensuring accurate reporting in the derivatives market, 
and in improving transparency.117 Akin to the transfer of supervisory responsibilities over 
CRAs, this transfer of power to ESMA was relatively straightforward. There were no major 
national trade repositories for Member States to seek control over; and such entities were 
unlikely to fail and require a bailout that could implicate the national taxpayer.118   
 
By comparison, the same could not be said in relation to the supervision of central 
counterparties (‘CCPs’), however. EMIR also introduced mandatory CCP clearing in relation 
to standardised derivatives transactions, 119  and one consequence of this was that CCPs 
increased in systemic importance. This had ramifications for the conferral of supervisory 
responsibilities,120 and the CCP oversight system in EMIR was left largely with the national 
regulators, rather than being transferred to ESMA.121  Indeed, although ESMA is granted a 
type of ‘gatekeeper’ role in relation to granting access to the EU for third country CCPs,122 
early drafts of the rules proposed that third country CCPs would obtain authorisation from 
each individual Member State.123 It was only due to much lobbying by industry groups (that 
argued that this approach could result in discrepancies between countries and could create 
barriers to trade) that responsibility here was eventually transferred to ESMA.124  
3.2.1 Enforcement Action: DTCC 
With respect to ESMA’s direct supervisory and enforcement powers over trade repositories, 
these mirror the CRA template, and ESMA has, to date, completed one enforcement action 
against DTCC Derivatives Repository Limited (‘DTCC’) resulting in a public censure and a 
64,000 euro fine. DTCC is the largest EU registered trade repository and in May 2014, 
ESMA’s supervisory team became aware of delays in DTCC providing regulators with access 
to the relevant trade data. 125  ESMA found that for approximately nine months, access delays 
occurred that increased from two days to as much as 62 days after reporting, affecting 26 
billion reports.126 The delays were due to DTCC’s negligence in failing to implement data 
                                                                                                                                                        
part-1/> accessed 2 August 2016; EMIR 2012, art 81(3) sets out the range of entities to whom trade 
repositiories must make the data available including ESMA, NCAs supervising central counterparties, 
and the NCAs supervising the trading venues of the reported contracts. 
117 ESMA, 2014 Annual Report on the Supervision of Credit Rating Agencies and Trade Repositories 
(n 48) 31. 
118 Eilis Ferran, ‘Financial Supervision’ (n 35) 34. 
119 EMIR 2012, art 4. The EU approach was in line with the international G20 commitments to improve 
oversight and transparency in OTC derivatives trading following the financial crisis, G20 Leaders 
Statement: The Pittsburgh Summit (September 2009).  
120 EMIR 2012, recital 52; art 22; Eilis Ferran, ‘Financial Supervision’ (n 35) 34.   
121 This oversight system is put in place via a complex college cooperation set-up, see EMIR 2012, art 
18; Niamh Moloney, ‘Resetting the Location of Regulatory and Supervisory Control over EU Financial 
Markets: Lessons from Five Years On’ (2013) 62 ICLQ 955, 965; Moloney, EU Securities and 
Financial Markets Regulation (n 23) 618. 
122 EMIR 2012, art 25; Eilis Ferran, ‘Understanding the New Institutional Architecture of EU Financial 
Market Supervision’ (n 13) 152.  
123 Moloney, EU Securities and Financial Markets Regulation (n 23) 618; Herbert Smith, EMIR: EU 
Regulation of OTC Derivatives, Central Counterparties and Trade Repositories (March 2012) 3. 
124 Herbert Smith (n 123) 3. See EMIR 2012, art 25 for the range of conditions that must be met. . 
125 ESMA, Decision Notice – DTCC Derivatives Repository Limited (ESMA/2016/408) 3.  
126 ESMA, ESMA Fines DTCC Derivatives Repository Limited €64,000 for Data Access Failures: 
Press Release (ESMA/2016/468). 
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processing systems capable of providing regulators with direct and immediate access. Further, 
once DTCC became aware of the issue, it failed to inform ESMA in a timely manner; and 
then took three months to establish an effective plan, even when the delays worsened.127  
ESMA concluded that DTCC was negligent in each respect, and the fine also represented 
aggravating factors (the infringement had continued for more than six months, it revealed 
systemic weaknesses in DTCC’s organisation, and had a negative impact on the quality of the 
data maintained by it).128  
 
This action is ESMA’s first enforcement case against a trade repository. The fine imposed 
was again relatively modest, especially when one factors in the aggravating factors, although 
in this instance, the press reports (despite being relatively limited) suggested that this would 
have been ‘embarrassing for one of the world’s most important market infrastructure 
organisations’.129  This hints at the possibility that reputational sanctions could play more of a 
role going forward here, although it is too early to tell, and this will ultimately also depend on 
the sufficiency of such coverage. More generally, the case signals that ESMA has willingly 
embraced this extension to its direct responsibilities. 
  
3.3 Case Study Three: Short Selling 
 
The third case study does not reflect the conferral of additional day-to-day direct powers on 
ESMA, yet it remains a pertinent case study to reflect on. Why? It is interwoven with the 
bigger picture concerning the incremental transfer of direct operational powers to ESMA over 
time. What is short selling? In brief, the practice concerns the sale of an asset (often shares) 
not owned by a seller with the aim of buying back an identical asset later for a lower price. 
Again in the light of (particularly political) concerns about this practice that arose during the 
financial and the sovereign debt crises, short selling is now the subject of a range of 
restrictions and requirements under the EU Short Selling Regulation (‘SSR’).130  
 
Focusing on ESMA, it is granted direct powers to intervene in the markets to prohibit or 
impose conditions on short sales in exceptional circumstances, with any such measure 
prevailing over previous measures taken by a national authority.131 ESMA can again only 
utilise these powers in exceptional, and tightly specified circumstances,132 and it must follow 
a precise procedure. 133  There is one caveat to this transfer of power: sovereign debt is 
                                                     
127 Ibid; ESMA, Decision Notice – DTCC Derivatives Repository Limited (n 125) 6. 
128 ESMA, Decision Notice – DTCC Derivatives Repository Limited (n 125) 7. 
129  ‘EU Watchdog Fines DTCC for Derivatives Repository Failings’ Reuters (31 March 2016) 
<http://www.reuters.com/article/eu-derivatives-regulator-idUSL5N173206> accessed 3 August 2016. 
Again, using a simple Internet news search, Reuters, and the Financial News provided the main 
coverage. There was no FT coverage of this fine. 
130 For further discussion see e.g. Elizabeth Howell, ‘Short Selling Restrictions in the EU and the US: 
A Comparative Analysis’ (2016) 16 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 333; Moloney, EU Securities 
and Financial Markets Regulation (n 23) 538; Jennifer Payne, ‘The Regulation of Short Selling and Its 
Reform in Europe’ (2012) 13 EBOR 413. 
131 Regulation 236/2012 art 28(11). 
132 Broadly, where there is a threat to the orderly functioning of markets or the stability of the financial 
system, there are cross-border implications, and NCAs have either not taken action, or the measures 
taken do not adequately address the threat. Ibid art 28. 
133 Ibid art 28(4)-(5); art 28(7). The procedure includes prior consultation with the European Systemic 
Risk Board, prior notifications to NCAs affected by any such measure, and publication of the measure 
on ESMA’s website. 
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excluded from ESMA’s ambit due to political concerns as to the possible impact on countries’ 
borrowing costs.134   
 
ESMA’s direct powers place it at the heart of important and delicate decisions with respect to 
short selling. The conferral of such powers also constitutes another significant step forward in 
relation to its ability to intervene directly in the markets. With this in mind, however, the UK 
sought to legally challenge the conferral of these powers on the basis of Meroni (as well as on 
other grounds) at the CJEU, alleging that the powers implied that ESMA was vested with a 
large measure of discretion, breaching the limits set by Meroni.135 This legal challenge was 
ultimately unsuccessful, however, and the CJEU affirmed the powers, as well as the legal 
basis on which they were adopted.136 Further, although it did not reject Meroni, on a liberal 
reading, it did ‘clip its wings’.137 If one adopts such a view, this could help ensure ESMA is 
on firmer constitutional footing going forward; on the other hand, if one takes a more 
restricted reading of the case, this may suggest that nothing, essentially, has changed.138   
3.3.1 ESMA’s Short Selling Powers in Practice 
ESMA has not yet utilised its direct powers of intervention with regards to short sales, so it 
remains to be seen what use it makes (if any) of this new competence. In related 
developments, however, following the UK’s Brexit vote in 2016, ESMA’s chairman 
confirmed that it and the Member State national authorities had coordinated in advance and 
decided there was no need to use their powers on the day of the result, including in relation to 
imposing any short selling bans.139   
 
Linked to this, however, ESMA has also issued a number of opinions over the years 
concerning the imposition of national emergency short sale bans, and an important shift is 
discernable here. In the main, ESMA has generally been supportive of such measures, yet its 
early opinions were notably brief, and tended to closely map the wording of the relevant 
rules. 140   Over time, however, ESMA has started to provide more detailed and incisive 
opinions,141 including issuing its first negative opinion. Specifically, in January 2016, ESMA 
                                                     
134 Ibid, art 28. 
135  Case C-270/12 United Kingdom v Council of the European Union and European Parliament 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:18. 
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137 Eilis Ferran, ‘European Banking Union: Imperfect, but It Can Work’ University of Cambridge 
Faculty of Law Research Paper No 30/2014 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2426247> accessed 6 January 2017. 
138  Moloney, EU Securities and Financial Markets Regulation (n 23) 1002-3. See also Niamh 
Moloney, ‘International Financial Governance, the EU, and Brexit: The ‘Agencification’ of EU 
Financial Governance and the Implications’ (2016) 17 EBOR 451, 461. 
139 See Huw Jones, ‘Market Infrastructure Coped Well with Brexit Fallout: EU Watchdog’ Reuters (29 
June 2016). 
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were adverse developments; that the measure was appropriate and proportionate, and that the 
measure’s duration was justified. See e.g. ESMA, Opinion on Spanish Emergency Measures 
(ESMA/2012/715); see also ESMA, Opinion on Greek Emergency Measures (ESMA/2013/542). 
141 This included for instance its nuanced review on a three-month emergency ban imposed by the 
Italian regulator, CONSOB, in July 2016 on Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena’s (‘BMPS’) shares 
ESMA, Opinion on Italian Emergency Measures (ESMA/2016/1078).  
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published a relatively detailed opinion opposing the proposed extension of an emergency 
short selling ban by the Greek regulator, relating to the shares of the Greek financial 
institution, Attica Bank S.A. 142 ESMA’s opinion was backed up with quantitative analysis 
which illustrated that the bank’s pricing history did not suggest a highly fragile situation; it 
also observed that the bank stood for only a very small part of the Greek banking sector with 
respect to financial stability concerns. ESMA concluded that renewing the measure was 
neither appropriate nor proportionate, and identified a number of other tools that could be 
utilised if a significant downward spiral in the share price was to occur.143 
 
The Greek regulator proceeded to implement its ban regardless, although it is probable that a 
combination of the reigniting of the Greek debt crisis, the broader political landscape, and the 
fragility of Greek relations within the EU all played a part in its decision. Nonetheless this 
instance remains significant for ESMA’s opposition. In particular it reflects a further 
strengthening of ESMA’s capacity as an EU supervisor, especially in its willingness to adopt 
an opposing position that directly criticises the stance of a national regulator.144  With an eye 
to the future, it is also likely that this will not be the only occasion when a national authority 
and ESMA disagree on whether emergency measures should be introduced. Consequently, in 
the event there are differences of opinion (and although the ESMA/national authorities 
interactions around the Brexit vote arguably augurs well for the future), the Greek negative 
opinion demonstrates ESMA gaining in confidence in its ability to assert itself as an EU 
authority. The question therefore remains open as to whether this could result in ESMA fully 
embracing its direct powers of intervention in a future crisis, especially in the absence of any 
NCA cooperation. 
4 ESMA: Implications for EU Supervisory Governance 
4.1 Overview 
 
The arguments geared towards transferring direct responsibility to ESMA over market actors, 
practices and activities are evident in the cases explored in section 3: direct oversight should 
ensure that there is greater consistency in applying the relevant rules; as well as enabling 
more effective and efficient supervision.145  Further, there is a functional logic to centralising 
certain supervisory powers with ESMA: it is a technocrat, and oversight and enforcement of 
market actors or practices with a pan-EU reach is, in certain areas, efficient and, in principle, 
should be effective. Empirically, the three case studies all illustrate that ESMA has embraced 
its direct responsibilities, and that it has also been assertive in utilising its more 
constitutionally sensitive enforcement powers.  
 
This section examines the implications for EU supervisory governance. First, it focuses on a 
number of recent reviews of ESMA that affirm ESMA’s direct role and also advocate the 
future allocation of direct operational responsibilities to it. It then reflects on some of the key 
barriers and constraints to ESMA’s operations, and it suggests that, given the evidence, none 
of these obstacles should be intractable in practice. 
 
4.2 Enhancing ESMA’s Credibility: Recent Reviews 
 
                                                     
142 ESMA, Opinion on Greek Emergency Measures (ESMA/2016/28) 6. 
143 Ibid 7. 
144 Moloney, ‘Institutional Governance and Capital Markets Union: Incrementalism or a "Big Bang"?’ 
(n 1) 418. 
145 Eilis Ferran, ‘Financial Supervision’ (n 35) 35. 
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ESMA has received considerable international and political endorsement of its direct mandate 
in a number of recent reviews.146  Although perhaps not impartial, in 2013, the founding 
father of the ESAs, Jacques de Larosière commented that ESMA had performed well and 
become a recognised international authority.147  Likewise, the Commission’s first ‘stocktake’ 
of the ESAs in 2014, observed that there was broad consensus as to the efficiency and 
effectiveness of ESMA’s direct supervision of the CRAs, as well as its mandate for 
supervising TRs.148 It also indicated that further tasks could be potentially assigned to ESMA 
in the future including the enforcement of international financial reporting standards, the 
direct supervision of CCPs, and the strengthening of ESMA’s direct settlement powers.149  
 
With respect to ESMA’s supervision over CRAs, a 2015 report by the European Court of 
Auditors considered that ESMA had laid down good foundations and a well established 
regime for effective supervision; and also set out a number of areas where there was room for 
improvement, including with respect to its record keeping and decision making processes. 150 
The Commission’s 2016 report on the CRA industry concluded that ESMA had the necessary 
tools to supervise the CRAs, but (as explored in section 3) emphasised that the sanctioning 
regime required revision to ensure it was credible and proportionate as a deterrent.151 The 
2017 Commission consultation on the operation of ESMA (and its sibling agencies) also 
outlined that further work was needed to ‘reinforce the European dimension of supervision’, 
and canvassed views on extensions to ESMA’s direct supervisory powers, particularly in 
order to develop integrated capital markets.152 
 
These (largely) positive endorsements all add to ESMA’s standing and work as a direct 
supervisor, and point towards the further augmentation of its direct responsibilities over time. 
ESMA itself is also embracing the evolving nature of its direct role. It has merged its 
supervision of CRAs and trade repositories into a single department to strengthen its position 
as a direct supervisor,153 and affirmed that it ‘stands ready’ to assume new tasks, should these 
be assigned, along with the appropriate resources.154  
                                                     
146 IMF; European Commission, Report on the Operation of the European Supervisory Authorities 
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4.3 ESMA’s Direct Role: Constraints to its Operation? 
 
ESMA is performing relatively well with respect to its broad range of direct tasks and 
responsibilities; nonetheless there are a number of key constraints and barriers (ranging from 
the practical to the political) to ESMA’s current operation. This section reflects on such 
hurdles but it speculates that none of these obstacles should be insurmountable in practice. 
 
The first issue concerns the institutional policy of confining supervisory powers to the ESAs 
by sector (securities, banking, insurance/pensions), as a type of ‘mirror’ to the financial 
industry.155 Given that the financial crisis demonstrated the serious pitfalls in using a ‘silo-
based’ approach to regulation and supervision, the continued reliance on such a system can be 
questioned. 156  In particular such an approach will not aid authorities in apprehending 
functionally equivalent, or emerging, risks (and in this regard it is notable that global 
prudential regulators are now starting to express an interest in the risks to financial stability 
that could be posed by the capital markets). 157 Further, a silo-based approach also creates the 
risk of regulatory arbitrage, whereby sophisticated market participants can capitalise on 
loopholes to avoid certain types of regulation. 158  Although it may prove premature to rethink 
the current sectorial architecture (especially factoring in political and organisational realities), 
and although it may be sensible to focus on ‘evolution rather than revolution’; there could be, 
for instance, efficiency and effectiveness benefits in merging the banking and 
insurance/pensions agencies, whilst also widening ESMA’s existing ambit.159   
 
Next, as explored in section 3, there are deep-rooted legal constraints placed on ESMA under 
Meroni. Indeed although the CJEU has endorsed ESMA’s powers of market intervention with 
respect to short sales, uncertainties remain as to the precise parameters within which EMSA 
can exercise its powers. This may result in ESMA being cautious, especially in exercising its 
more controversial direct powers, in order to avoid the risk of any future litigation.160 Indeed, 
the empirical findings support this; ESMA has not used its direct short selling powers, and it 
has been perceived from some quarters as adopting a timid stance to its direct enforcement 
activity. On the other hand, were ESMA to receive clearer guidance from the CJEU going 
forward, this could help guarantee that ESMA was operating on firmer legal footing. 
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Practical barriers also exist to ESMA’s operation; an increase in ESMA’s workload has not 
been mirrored by an equivalent increase in its human resources and budget, hampering its 
ability to perform.161 Indeed although ESMA’s budget has increased since its creation, its 
funding arrangements are not proportionate to its increasing workload and duties.162 ESMA’s 
precise funding set-up is also relevant here. All three ESAs are funded via a subsidy from the 
EU, as well as receiving contributions from the NCAs, however ESMA is also partially 
funded via annual fees levied on the private entities it supervises: the CRAs and trade 
repositories.163 The funding ESMA receives from the EU and the national authorities is far 
from ideal, however: for instance, ESMA’s independence could be undermined by the role of 
both the NCAs and the Commission in financing them.164  Further, as ESMA grows, the 
contribution from NCAs could become a heavy burden for smaller Member States, creating a 
risk of non-payment.165   
 
Again, this issue is now being tackled; the Commission is consulting on improving the ESAs’ 
funding structures, including whether the system could be changed to a partly, or fully, 
industry funded model. 166   However, it remains clear that there are a number of risks, 
including as to ‘double charges’, whereby market actors could be funding both its own 
national authority and ESMA. Further, even if a domestic fee could be offset, this could risk 
negatively impacting the operation of the relevant national body.167 Nevertheless, as the NCA 
and ESMA functions are not identical, perhaps it could be feasible to implement a type of 
dual system going forward.168 Whichever funding model is adopted, the resources available to 
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ESMA should be increased considerably to enable ESMA to effectively carry out its existing 
operations, and to improve the likelihood of any further transfers of direct responsibilities.169   
 
A further obstacle concerns a lack of political will. In particular, as explored in section 3, the 
main reservations stem from fiscal matters; as the Member State and national taxpayers ‘foot 
the bill’ when a market actor fails, the adage ‘he who pays the piper, calls the tune’ applies, 
with knock-on implications for the allocation of supervisory responsibilities.170  Although the 
CRAs and the trade repositories were unlikely to be a source of fiscal risk for Member States, 
this issue is likely to present the main stumbling block to the Commission’s current 
suggestion that direct supervisory competence be subsequently transferred to ESMA over 
CCPs.171  
 
Closely interwoven with this, however, is the prevailing political climate. With respect to the 
EU’s CMU project, the recent ‘Five Presidents Report’172 expressed the need to strengthen the 
EU’s supervisory framework in order to ensure financial stability. Notably, however, the 
report also contained more controversial hints, including that such moves should ultimately 
lead to a single European capital markets supervisor.173  Despite the rhetoric, however, it is 
unlikely that any such dramatic developments will materialise in the near future (absent 
another global crisis). The EU is not at the stage of creating a ‘EU-SEC’. Instead, it is more 
probable that ESMA’s direct powers and influence will follow the pattern empirically 
observable so far. ESMA will continue to be an important driver in shaping how EU 
supervisory governance evolves as a type of ‘boots on the ground’ supervisor, and this in 
itself may gradually lead to incremental enhancements of its direct powers, particularly as an 
accompaniment to the EU’s current initiative to develop deeper and more integrated capital 
markets. 
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How this is likely to be affected by the current shake-up of the EU caused by the Brexit vote 
is impossible to predict. At this stage, the most that can be said is that it may reinforce some 
leanings towards an increased centralisation of powers, including with respect to greater 
supervisory integration. 174   Indeed, this stance is evident in the Commission’s current 
consultation, which reflects on the changing political landscape and explores areas where 
extensions to ESMA’s direct supervisory powers could contribute to deeper market 
integration.175 
 
One way or another, however, in the field of direct enforcement, ESMA’s hands remain tied 
in a more practical regard. As observed in section 3, the Meroni constraints result in ESMA 
only being able to impose relatively small sanctions via an inflexible procedural framework. 
Without ESMA being granted the ability (that a national regulator, or ESMA’s comparative 
cousin, the SEC has) to impose sufficiently tough penalties, ESMA will struggle to have any 
deterrent impact on the dominant market participants.  How might this problem best be 
tackled? First, ESMA’s sanctioning policy could be specifically shaped around the objectives 
of punishment and deterrence (in line with the approach taken in the field of competition 
enforcement). Linked to this, increasing the upper limit on fines, and directly coupling the 
penalties to an entity’s turnover could help ensure they may have a dissuasive effect in 
practice. 176   Finally, a more radical proposition could involve granting ESMA limited 
competence in the arena of criminal penalties, although such a proposal is unlikely to ever 
gain sufficient political traction.  
5. Conclusion 
 
ESMA has, in the main, seized the day with its new role as a direct supervisor. It has shown 
itself to be a pro-active patroller of the markets that is also prepared to engage with the more 
politically delicate aspects of its watch. ESMA has acknowledged that it is still at a relatively 
early development stage with respect to its direct role, but it is building up a reputation as a 
credible direct watchdog that has also been endorsed politically and internationally.177  
 
ESMA is gradually strengthening its influence in this operational area (with a notable recent 
instance being its negative short selling opinion). This article speculates that ESMA is likely 
to continue to be a significant driver in shaping EU supervisory governance going forward 
and this is likely to result in the greater centralisation of supervisory powers, over time. 
Despite the change in the air following the Brexit vote, the article suggests that it remains 
probable that future supervisory governance shifts will evolve gradually and in a somewhat 
unspectacular fashion. Yet when one bears in mind the empirical evidence, ESMA remains in 
prime position to play a major influence, and none of the barriers to its operation are in fact 
insurmountable.  
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